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3 A classic reference on his topic is Veblen (1989 [1899]). Other major studies that deserve to be highlighted include Russell (2006 
[1930]), Hirsch (1976), Scitovsky (1976) and Galbraith (2008 [1958]). We could go back in time, to the Greek Classical period, 
during which the concern of thinkers was the improvement of people’s happiness.
4 The publication dates indicated are those of the Spanish-language versions of the text used as the basis for this study.
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6 In February 2008 Nicolas Sarkozy asked Joseph Stiglitz (Chair), Amartya Sen (Advisor) and Jean Paul Fitoussi (Coordinator) to 
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mission was to “identify the limits of GDP as an indicator of economic performance and social progress, including the problems 
with its measurement; to consider what additional information might be required for the production of more relevant indicators of 
social progress; to assess the feasibility of alternative measurement tools, and to discuss how to present the statistical information 
in an appropriate way” (Stiglitz et al., 2009b).
1. Introduction 
The professed object of Dr. Adam Smith’s in-
quiry is the nature and causes of the wealth of 
nations. There is another inquiry, however, per-
haps still more interesting, which he occasio-
nally mixes with it, I mean an inquiry into the 
causes which affect the happiness of nations.
T.R. Malthus (1798)
This quote from Malthus evidences an interest 
in investigating the causes that affect well-be-
ing and happiness. That interest has always 
been –and indeed continues to be– an area of 
reflection and study for numerous social sci-
entists all over the world3. Some degree of 
reproach towards Smith can be observed for 
not having investigated more into the matter of 
how, when and under what conditions wealth 
turns into happiness. In spite of this critique, 
when Malthus wrote his Principles of Political 
Economy in 1820, he stated that the essential 
object of political economy was to “inquire 
into the causes which influence the progress of 
wealth” (Malthus, 2008 [1820]: 29)4.
Luigi Pasinetti argues that Malthus and 
other classical economists had to face the task 
of building the foundations of a new science. 
They could not have undertaken this task if 
they had not focused on a variable such as 
wealth, that is a topic of inquiry more restrict-
ed than happiness, but which can be defined 
objectively (Pasinetti, 2005).
The way this issue was approached changed 
in the second half of the 20th century with the ad-
vent of the first neoclassical economists. Influ-
enced by Bentham’s utilitarianism, they ceased 
to concern themselves with the objective concept 
of wealth and switched to the subjective concept 
of happiness, a term that the first neoclassical 
cardinalists saw as a synonym of pleasure, util-
ity, well-being or satisfaction. In neoclassical 
theory the value of a good is no longer consid-
ered to be determined by the amount of work 
needed to produce it, but rather by the amount of 
pleasure or happiness that it provides to whoever 
owns or uses it (Colander, 2007).
In this article we will first look at some of 
the main issues regarding Happiness Econom-
ics5 at present, and will then set out to show 
that for W.S. Jevons and F.Y. Edgeworth, two 
prominent neoclassical authors, the object of 
economics was to maximise happiness, an as-
pect in which they coincide with current hap-
piness economists. In other words, we seek to 
show that the interest of happiness economists 
is not new but is backed up by a significant eco-
nomic tradition linked to utilitarian philosophy 
that dates to the second half of the 19th century. 
The question arises of whether it is pos-
sible to know for sure what makes us happy. 
In this sense, German philosopher Immanuel 
Kant warned that “The problem of determin-
ing surely and universally which action would 
promote the happiness of a rational being is 
completely insoluble” because happiness “is 
not an ideal of reason but of imagination” 
(Kant, 2007 [1785]: 33).
Despite Kant’s warning, there is current-
ly considerable interest in the measurement of 
happiness and its causes, in both academic and 
political circles. A case in point is the publica-
tion on 14 September 2009 of the Report by the 
Commission on the Measurement of Economic 
Performance and Social Progress6, known as 
the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi Report, drawn up by 25 
prominent social scientists, including five win-
ners of the Nobel Prize for Economics. Their re-
mit was to prepare statistical data and indicators 
capable of properly measuring economic and 
social progress (Stiglitz et al., 2009a).
The authors of the report maintain that 
“measures of both objective and subjective 
well-being” –life satisfaction, happiness– “pro-
vide key information about people’s quality of 
life” and therefore “statistical offices should in-
corporate questions to capture people’s own life 
evaluations, hedonic experiences and priorities 
in their own survey” (Stiglitz et al., 2009b: 15).
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In short, knowledge of the causes that pro-
mote people’s subjective well-being is of in-
terest at both individual and institutional lev-
els. Happiness Economics uses the responses 
given by individuals in surveys when they are 
asked about their levels of  life satisfaction and 
happiness, to look for correlations and seeks to 
quantify the influence of variables such us in-
come, employment, health, education, etc. on 
people’s declared subjective well-being.
The following section looks at Happiness 
Economics as a line of research that began 
to emerge in the 1970s and has become more 
widespread in the opening years of the 21st 
century. Section 3 focuses on the economic 
analysis of happiness in the writings of Jevons 
and Edgeworth. Section 4 sets out the main 
conclusions of our study. 
2. Happiness Economics as an emerging 
research line7 
As stated above, there is currently an upsurge 
in interest in happiness as a topic for economic 
analysis. According to Cachón (2013), Hap-
piness Economics is a current of economic 
analysis that questions the role of wealth as the 
prime explanatory variable for well-being and 
holds that the economy exists because of and 
for individuals, with the object of raising levels 
of both individual and collective well-being. 
Oswald (1997) had already raised this question 
in his assertion that “the relevance of econom-
ic performance is that it may be a means to an 
end. That end is not consumption of beef burg-
ers, or the accumulation of television sets, not 
the vanquishing of some high level of interest 
rates, but rather the enrichment of mankind’s 
feeling of well-being. Economic things matter 
only in so far as they make people happier”.
This line of research holds that income 
does not determine the happiness of an indi-
vidual and economic benefits are not an end 
in themselves for society. This emerging dis-
cipline can be said to dethrone many of the 
assumptions of conventional economic analy-
sis. The approach has been widely accepted, 
to the extent that it is gaining ground among 
many governments and institutions such as the 
OECD and the European Commission –Sus-
tainable Development Goals (SDGs).
2.1. Outstanding earlier work
The reason why it has taken so long for eco-
nomics to be incorporated into the realm of 
happiness may be the reluctance of economists 
to use subjective variables. Peiró (2004) argues 
that the lack of interest in studying individual 
well-being could stem from new ordinal the-
ories of utility or from the belief that it is not 
possible to measure happiness. It seems that 
the first major reference point in what is now 
known as Happiness Economics8 is a paper 
led by psychologists rather than economists: 
Brickman & Campbell (1971) examine indi-
vidual and collective happiness and conclude 
that improvements in individual wealth and in-
come do not necessarily result in real improve-
ments in people’s well-being. 
These conclusions in turn influenced pa-
pers by two other researchers who were indeed 
economists: Richard Easterlin (1974) and 
Tibor Scitovsky (1976). Both these authors 
looked at the role played by income as a de-
terminant for happiness. In his 1974 paper, the 
US-born Easterlin used the results of his own 
empirical research as the basis for asserting 
that per capita income in the USA had doubled 
from 1946 to 1970, while happiness had barely 
increased over the same period. 
Along the same lines, Scitovsky (1976) 
sought to explain why the comfortable lifestyle 
enjoyed by wealthy, developed societies could 
lead to feelings of frustration and emptiness in 
the citizens of these countries, i.e. why a high 
level of material well-being did not seem to 
translate directly to a high level of personal 
happiness. 
Another major reference point in Happiness 
Economics can be found in three pioneering 
studies published in The Economic Journal in 
November 1997 by Andrew Oswald, Robert 
Frank and Yew Kwang Ng. These papers sought 
mainly to open up a debate concerning the im-
7 Most authors, see for example Clark (2016), use the terms happiness, utility and, among others, satisfaction interchangeably. The 
analysis of the small differences and nuances between these terms exceeds the scope of this article. 
8 Nor must it be forgotten that the earliest influences evidenced in later studies in this field come from schools of classical philos-
ophy. The first is hedonism, as championed by Epicurus, which defended the realisation of all individual pleasures and saw them 
as the source of individual happiness. Eudaemonics, of which Aristotle was the main proponent, attributes a highly important role 
to political or social life as a determinant of happiness. In this context, Smith (1759) and Smith (1776) should be compared and 
contrasted.
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portance of happiness in the field of econom-
ic analysis. They argued that it made sense to 
measure happiness and that happiness should 
once again play a core role in the Economic sci-
ence (Oswald, 1997; Frank, 1997; Ng, 1997).
Finally, we must also mention the contri-
bution made by the economist Richard Layard 
(2005) of the London School of Economics, 
who argues in favour of government interven-
tion in matters of taxation and education in 
order to promote general happiness. He main-
tains that to raise satisfaction levels among 
the public, the degree of competitive struggle 
between individuals for socio-economic status 
(the “rat race”) must be reduced. One of his 
main arguments is that the individual struggle 
for economic and social status generates neg-
ative externalities that must be combated if 
higher aggregate levels of happiness are to be 
attained. We conclude this section with a spe-
cial mention to Angus Deaton, winner of the 
Nobel Prize for Economics (2015), clearly a 
Happiness Economist. 
2.2. The Easterlin paradox
In 1974 Easterlin published a paper that is 
generally regarded as one of the main precur-
sors of the Economics of Happiness. Its title is 
Does Economic Growth Improve The Human 
Lot? Some Empirical Evidence. Easterlin be-
gins by citing Moses Abramovitz’s work The 
Welfare Interpretation of National Income and 
Product (Abramovitz, 1959), in which the au-
thor concludes that we should be highly scep-
tical about the idea that rates of increase in 
long-term well-being can be measured, even 
approximately, on the basis of growth rates in 
output (Abramovitz, 1959: 1-2). 
This scepticism led Abramovitz to call on 
the profession to conduct theoretical reflec-
tions and empirical studies that could shed 
light on the true nature of the relationship be-
tween economic growth and general well-be-
ing. Easterlin states that his paper was intend-
ed as a response to Abramovitz’s call (Easter-
lin, 1974: 89).
Accordingly, he tackles the question of the 
link between income and happiness from an em-
pirical viewpoint, covering the period between 
1946 and 1970 and including 19 countries, some 
of them highly developed and others less so, us-
ing data from 30 different investigations. 
In this context, the main question asked by 
Easterlin was this: is there any evidence to sug-
gest that economic growth is positively asso-
ciated with social well-being, i.e. with human 
happiness? (Easterlin, 1974: 90). The findings 
of his study can be summed up as follows:
1. For a given country in each time period, 
Easterlin finds clear indications that income 
and happiness are positively correlated, i.e. 
that those individuals who enjoy the high-
est social status are on average happier than 
those with a lower status (Easterlin, 1974: 
99-100); 
2. When comparisons are drawn between 
countries there is no clear evidence that 
those countries which are wealthier on av-
erage are, as might have been expected, 
happier on average (Easterlin, 1974: 106).
3. When studying time series for the case of 
the USA, he finds no clear evidence that in-
creases in income over time are paralleled 
by increases in subjective happiness (East-
erlin, 1974: 110-111).
Results 2 and 3 can be seen as contradicting 
result 1. This contradiction has become known 
in the literature on Happiness Economics as 
the “Easterlin paradox”. 
Easterlin himself explains the paradox as 
essentially based on James Duesenberry’s rel-
ative income theory. This theory states that an 
increase in the income of a single individual 
may increase his own happiness, but an equiv-
alent increase for all individuals could result 
in there being no change in the level of happi-
ness (Duesenberry, 1972: 66). In this context, 
it can be argued that economic growth does not 
necessarily result in an increase in the level of 
happiness of citizens. 
Two more important explanations stem 
from the field of psychology: the psychologist 
and winner of the Nobel Prize for Economics 
Daniel Kahneman has popularised the image 
of the treadmill as a metaphor for a situation in 
which people strive to move forward in terms 
of income but are unaware that those move-
ments hardly give rise to any progress in terms 
of happiness after the first few moments of eu-
phoria (Kahneman & Sugden, 2005).
These treadmills include the “hedonic 
treadmill”, on which people get used to having 
more income after a time, and the “aspiration-
al treadmill”, on which having more income 
leads people to aspire to having still more. 
Psychologists argue that the operation of these 
two psychological mechanisms can mean that 
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increases in income hardly result in any in-
creases in happiness in the long term. 
For his part, Tibor Scitovsky offers quite 
an original explanation for the happiness para-
dox, based on a distinction between two sensa-
tions or feelings of a subjective nature: pleas-
ure and comfort. He suggests that advanced 
societies must choose between the two, which 
could become mutually exclusive. Thus, con-
tinuously experiencing the maximum level of 
comfort would take away the inherent pleasure 
of gradually attaining higher levels of comfort. 
In this context the author argues that in to-
day’s advanced societies we have and pay for 
more comfort than we need for a good life and 
that our comforts can actually eliminate from 
our environment some of the most important 
pleasures for a happy life (Scitovsky, 1976).
Finally, for the case of the USA, some 
authors argue that one possible explanation 
for the slight drop in the level of subjective 
well-being in the country from 1972 to 2006 
could be that the benefits of economic growth 
have been distributed among the people in a 
markedly unequal fashion (Stevenson & Wolf-
ers, 2008: 24)9. 
It has also been argued that there has been 
not only an increase in the inequality of income 
distribution, as measured by indices such as that 
of Gini, but also an extreme concentration of in-
come increases in high and very high income 
brackets10 (Hacker & Pierson, 2010: 155-156).
In short, the Easterlin paradox refers to the 
fact that increases in per capita income are not 
accompanied by parallel increases in the sub-
jective feeling of satisfaction with life as de-
clared by the population questioned in surveys 
on the matter. 
Other authors, such as Iglesias et al. 
(2013), maintain that the paradox alludes to 
the fact that increases in income levels do not 
give rise to increases in levels of collective 
well-being, even though there is a direct link 
between income and well-being on an indi-
vidual level. In other words, what goes for 
individuals cannot be generalised to the pop-
ulation as a whole. 
But strictly speaking Happiness Economics 
did not emerge until the 1970s, and it is not 
confined solely to the happiness-income para-
dox. The following section of this article looks 
at the origins of this line of research, focus-
sing on the contributions made by Jevons and 
Edgeworth to the field.
3. An examination of the origins of 
Happiness Economics
For classical economists (Smith, Malthus, Ri-
cardo, Marx) the focus of economic analysis 
was mainly located in the study of macroeco-
nomic issues such as the wealth of nations, the 
production and distribution of income and inter-
national trade. However in the second half of the 
19th century economists turned the focus of their 
interest away from macroeconomics towards 
microeconomics. Joan Robinson describes this 
change in emphasis as a shift away from clas-
sical economics’ big questions of development 
and distribution towards questions of little im-
portance such as “why does an egg cost more 
than a cup of tea?” (Robinson, 1953: 22).
This shift in the centre of interest of econom-
ic analysis also extended to the abandonment of 
the “labour theory of value” in favour of the 
“utility theory of value”. Classical economists 
held that the value of a good stemmed from the 
amount of socially necessary labour to produce 
it, while neoclassical economists saw the val-
ue of a good as depending on the satisfaction/
happiness/utility that it provided to its holder 
or consumer. In that context the measurability 
of utility (or its equivalents) became an issue of 
particular importance (Colander, 2007: 216). 
In short, the advent of marginal analysis led 
economics away from dealing with the objective 
concept of wealth and into dealing with happi-
ness interpreted as utility, a subjective concept 
with psychological connotations, linked to the 
idea of satisfying human needs11. Bruni (2007) 
sustains that we are dealing here with the meth-
odological project of Jeremy Bentham, which 
fed into economics thanks to the work of Wil-
9 Indeed in the 40 years from 1967 to 2007, the Gini coefficient changes from 0.36 to approximately 0.44, which has led some 
authors to argue that one of the most profound changes in the USA in the last forty years has been the growth of income inequality 
between social classes (Oishi et al., 2011: 1095).
10 The proportion of income (before tax) that goes to the top 1% of richest individuals increased from 8% in 1974 to 18% by 2007 
(Hacker & Pierson, 2010: 156). If capital gains and dividends from investment are included, the rise in the proportion of income 
that goes to the top 1% was from around 9% to 23.5% over that period. Data for the top 0.1% richest people in the USA (around 
150,000 families) shows that their percentage of total income rose from 2.7% to 12.3%, i.e. increased by almost 4.5-fold; finally, 
the figure for the 0.01% richest (15,000 families) rose from below 1% in 1974 to over 6% in 2007 (Hacker & Pierson, 2010: 155).
11 The influence of Benthamite philosophy can be observed here.
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liam Stanley Jevons and Francis Ysidro Edge-
worth. Psychology thus entered headlong into 
economic analysis, though with the turn of the 
century (Pareto’s ordinal utility analysis), it 
would be expelled once again (Edwards, 2009). 
As seen above, it was not until the 1970s that it 
was rescued –seemingly for good this time.
3.1. William Stanley Jevons (1835–1882)
Jevons was a leading follower of the utility the-
ory and a confirmed Utilitarian12 (Schumpeter, 
1982: 1147). He expressly acknowledged his 
indebtedness to Jeremy Bentham, whose ide-
as he adopted as the starting point for his own 
economic theories based entirely on calculat-
ing pleasure and pain. For Jevons the object of 
economics is to maximise happiness by gaining 
pleasure while minimising the cost in terms of 
pain. He has no hesitation in accepting the Util-
itarian theory of morals, that upholds the effect 
of the actions of the agents on the happiness of 
mankind, as the criterion of what is right and 
wrong (Jevons, 1998: 81). This is how happi-
ness, fully identified with pleasure, found its 
way into the mainstream as the new object of the 
new science of economics (Bruni, 2006:105).
In this context there is a need to exactly 
define what is meant by pleasure and by pain. 
Jevons proposes the following: “Call any mo-
tive which attracts us to a certain course of 
conduct, pleasure; and call any motive which 
deters us from that conduct, pain”. He argues 
that it becomes impossible to deny that all hu-
man actions are governed by pleasure and pain 
(Jevons, 1998: 83).
Jevons explains that the intensity of feel-
ings of pleasure and pain can be estimated at a 
moment in time as the total amount of feelings 
produced in each period. He goes on to cite 
Bentham, albeit in simplified form, and main-
tains that the circumstances to be considered 
when estimating a pleasure or pain are the fol-
lowing: intensity, duration, (un)certainty and 
proximity or distance. By way of example, 
he states that “Two days of the same degree 
of happiness are to be twice as much desired 
as one day; two days of suffering are twice as 
much feared” (Jevons, 1998: 86).
Jevons continues to simplify the problem 
until he reduces feelings of pleasure and pain 
to just two dimensions: duration and intensi-
ty. He proposes that time be measured on the 
x-axis (x) and intensity on the y-axis (y):
12 As is well known, traditional microeconomic theory takes on board the Utilitarian philosophy of human behaviour according to 
which all individuals seek to maximise their own happiness. This means that individuals will make decisions only after a hedon-
istic calculation in which they weigh up the pleasures and pains inherent in every action or activity. Neoclassical economists took 
this approach as the basis for constructing their theory of value. They assumed that individuals acted as if they were equipped with 
a psychological mechanism that enabled them to measure and compare the pleasure and pain associated with different actions. 
Just as a thermometer measures the temperature, this alleged mechanism would measure the happiness or utility inherent in the 
various economic options available. In this context, the concepts of utility and happiness were considered to be largely synony-
mous. The concept of utility devised by Utilitarian economists was also cardinal in nature, i.e. measurable and comparable, like 
temperature or length (Esteve, 2008: 7; Esteve & Muñoz de Bustillo, 2005: 608-609).
Figure 1: Total amount of feeling produced in different time periods. Source: (Jevons, 1998: 87)
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He also sustains that the proper representa-
tion of the variation of feeling can be found in a 
curve “of more or less complex character. […] 
The height […] of the curve pq above the hori-
zontal line ox indicates the intensity of feeling 
in a moment of time; and the whole quantity 
of feeling generated in the time period mn is 
measured by the area bounded by the lines pm, 
qn, mn and pq” (Jevons, 1998: 87-88).
Along the same lines, Jevons argues that 
feelings can also be anticipated –an idea close 
to what would now be referred to as “expec-
tations”. He believes that there must always 
be a link between the amount of feeling an-
ticipated and the amount that is actually felt. 
Thus the intensity of present anticipated feel-
ing “must, to use a mathematical expression, 
be some function of the future actual feeling 
and of the intervening time, and it must in-
crease as we approach the moment of realisa-
tion […] We may safely call that man happy 
who, however lowly his position and limited 
his possessions, can always hope for more 
than he has, and can feel that every moment 
of exertion tends to realise his aspirations” 
(Jevons, 1998: 89-90).
Jevons holds that this main idea of max-
imising happiness by buying pleasure at the 
lowest possible cost is the goal of the econo-
my and needs to be specified. Accordingly he 
focuses on “any object, substance, action or 
service which can afford pleasure or ward off 
pain”13. He argues that these are objects that 
can be classed as commodities because they 
have the quality of utility, in the sense of “the 
abstract quality whereby an object serves our 
purposes”. Whatever can produce pleasure 
or prevent pain may possess utility, but mor-
al considerations are avoided in the term. In 
short, Jevons asserts that “[a]nything which 
an individual is found to desire and to labour 
for must be assumed to possess for him utility. 
In the science of Economics, we treat men not 
as they ought to be, but as they are” (Jevons, 
1998: 93-94).
This main idea thus translates as, or can be 
taken as equivalent to, meeting human needs 
at the lowest possible cost. In Jevons’ opinion, 
we work to produce with the sole end of con-
sumption, so “the theory of Economics must 
begin with a correct theory of consumption”. 
He points out that many economists have held 
this to be clearly so and cites as an example 
Bastiat’s14 assertion: “Wants, Efforts, Satisfac-
tion –this is the circle of Political Economy” 
(Jevons, 1998: 95)16.
“Utility” and “happiness” are fully synon-
ymous in Jevons’ theory because, as he him-
self points out, “[u]tility must be considered as 
measured by, or even as actually identical with, 
the addition made to a person’s happiness. It 
is a convenient name for the aggregate of the 
favourable balance of feeling produced”, the 
sum of the pleasure created, and the pain pre-
vented (Jevons, 1998: 98). 
From there on, Jevons highlights the need 
to distinguish between the total utility arising 
from any commodity and the degree of utili-
ty (marginal utility) of the commodity at any 
point16. Utility (happiness) can be considered 
as a quantity with two dimensions: one com-
prises the quantity of the commodity (Jevons 
gives the example of the quantity of food) and 
is measured on the x-axis; the other is the in-
tensity of utility, and is measured on the y-axis, 
thus:
13 Jevons cites food, clothing, buildings, utensils, furniture, ornaments, etc. as examples.
14 Frédéric Bastiat (1801-1850), a French economist and intensely liberal thinker in the sense that he was a firm defender of lais-
sez-faire and did not favour state intervention. He is generally considered as lightweight in his economic approach (Naredo, 1987: 
130). One of his main ideas, which emerged from his optimistic, laissez-faire approach, was that free market formed of itself a 
harmonious mechanism that tended to favour the interests of individuals belonging to all social classes. According to Schumpeter, 
Bastiat’s name “might have gone down to posterity as the most brilliant economic journalist who ever lived” had he not written 
his Harmonies économiques in 1850, a work that clearly exposed his scant powers of reasoning and his inability to handle the 
analytical apparatus of economics. However Schumpeter does admit out that his book cannot be said to be devoid of good ideas 
(Schumpeter, 1982: 561).
15 Jevons refers in this passage to Harmonies of Political Economy, the 1860 English translation by P.J. Stirling of Bastiat’s Harmo-
nies économiques. A Spanish version was published in 1855 under the title Armonías Económicas (Jevons, 1998: 95).
16 Total utility and Degree of Utility in the original. At that time these concepts were referred to by different names. In this 
regard Schumpeter points out that “As everybody knows, Léon Walras retained the term rareté; Gossen had spoken of utility 
of the last atom; Jevons introduced final utility and final degree of utility; the phrase marginal utility (Grenznutzen) is von 
Wieser’s; Wicksteed suggested fractional utility, J. B. Clark specific utility, Pareto ophélimité élémentaire (Schumpeter, 
1982: 1146).
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In Figure 2 oa represents x and ab is the 
degree of utility at the point a. Now, if we 
increase x by the small quantity aa’or ∆x , 
the utility is increased by the small rectangle 
abb’a’or ∆u; and since a rectangle is the prod-
uct of its sides, we find that the length of the 
line ab, the degree of utility, is represented by 
the fraction ΔuΔx  […] This way the limit of this 
fraction
 
Δu
Δx
 or, as it is commonly expressed, 
du
dx
, is the degree of utility corresponding to 
the quantity of commodity x” (Jevons, 1998: 
98-102). 
The high level of detail with which we look 
here at what Jevons means by “utility” (total 
or marginal) is, we believe, justified because, 
in his theory, “utility” and “happiness” mean 
the same thing. Thus, the better we understand 
what Jevons means by utility, the more we will 
understand what he means by happiness within 
the field of economic theory. When he speaks 
of utility (happiness) he refers to the enjoy-
ment or pleasure that a person derives from the 
consumption of goods purchased on the mar-
ket. It could be concluded that this is a much 
simplified idea of happiness.
In short, Jevons sees the object of econom-
ics as being to maximise happiness by pur-
chasing pleasure at the lowest possible cost. In 
that context, he clarifies that commodities are 
goods that have the abstract quality of utility, 
understood as the ability to produce pleasure 
or prevent pain. Commodities thus have util-
ity to the extent that they provide pleasure or, 
equivalently for Jevons, provide happiness. 
Thus, he sees utility and happiness/pleasure as 
equivalent concepts which are fully identified 
and enter into economics to take up a position 
at the heart of neoclassical economics as the 
new object of study. The criterion for accept-
ing or rejecting a given action depends on its 
effect on happiness, as maintained by the mor-
al theory of utility. In other words, Jevons can 
be seen as asserting that economics is the sci-
ence of happiness. 
3.2. Francis Ysidro Edgeworth (1845–1926)
To set Edgeworth in the context of the topic un-
der discussion here, we follow Joseph Schum-
peter and begin by pointing to “his utilitarian-
ism, which strongly asserted itself from the be-
ginning”, in his work New and Old Methods of 
Ethics (1877); a utilitarianism that “did much 
to keep alive –quite unnecessarily– the unholy 
alliance between economics and Benthamite 
philosophy” (Schumpeter, 1982: 909).
In 1881 Edgeworth, who is thought by au-
thors such as Sen (Sen, 2010: 215) to be per-
haps the best economic theorist of the late 19th 
century, published his classic work on eco-
nomic theory Mathematical Psychics: An Es-
Figure 2: Total & marginal utility from consumption of a good x. (Jevons, 1998: 100)
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say on the Application of Mathematics to the 
Moral Sciences17.
In the mentioned work, Edgeworth sup-
ports the advisability of applying to the field of 
economics the same mathematical terms that 
are applied to physics, because “the concep-
tion of man as a pleasure machine may justify 
and facilitate the employment of mechanical 
terms and mathematical reasoning in social 
science” (Edgeworth, 2000: 56).
One of the problems faced in the field of 
pleasure is, says Edgeworth, that of measure-
ment. He acknowledges, in contrast to what 
happens in physics, that we are far from find-
ing a practical solution that would enable us 
to measure the pleasurable and painful feel-
ings inherent in mental activity. Indeed, it is 
doubtful whether we can even conceive how 
such feelings or psychical phenomena might 
be measured. But given that mathematical rea-
soning requires the consideration of a unit of 
measurement, it must be assumed that there 
is a “unit of pleasure”, understood as a “just 
perceivable increment” in pleasure, so as to be 
able to make quantitative calculations “which 
a man can form (I) of his own pleasure, and 
(II) of other people’s.” (Edgeworth, 2000: 133, 
Appendix III: On Hedonimetry).
Edgeworth suggests that we imagine a 
“psychophysical machine”, which he calls a 
“hedonimeter”, which continually registers the 
levels of pleasure experienced by an individ-
ual. Then “the quantity of happiness between 
two time periods is represented by the area 
contained between the zero-line, perpendicu-
lars thereto at the points corresponding to the 
epochs, and the curve traced by the index”. 
The axiom to be taken into account now is the 
following: “Any just perceivable pleasure-in-
crement experienced by any sentient at any 
time has the same value”. The aforesaid ide-
al mechanism is used here, again taking into 
account “the number of sentients and to inte-
grate through all time and over all sentience, 
to constitute the end of pure utilitarianism” 
(Edgeworth, 2000: 135-136, Appendix III: On 
Hedonimetry).
This operation consists of updating or bring-
ing together over time the pleasure that exists at 
each instant of time. In Edgeworth’s opinion, it 
is “the end of rational action, whether self-in-
terested or benevolent” (Edgeworth, 2000: 53).
Edgeworth holds that there are two ap-
proaches to the calculation of pleasure: the 
“economical calculus”, which “investigates 
the equilibrium of a system of hedonic forces 
each tending to maximum individual utility” 
and the “utilitarian calculus”, which investi-
gates “the equilibrium of a system in which 
each and all tend to maximum universal util-
ity” (Edgeworth, 2000: 59). 
In reference to the “economical calculus” 
or calculus of maximum individual utility, he 
holds that “(t)he first principle of Economics is 
that every agent is actuated only by self-inter-
est”. From this perspective, Edgeworth consid-
ers that it may happen that economic agents act 
without or with the consent of others affected 
by his actions. He describes the first case as a 
case of “war” and the second as one of “con-
tract” (Edgeworth, 2000: 60).
Edgeworth then looks in detail at the possi-
bility that contracts may be conducted in con-
texts of perfect competition, and at the con-
tractual uncertainties and problems that arise 
from cases in which markets suffer from one 
or more imperfections. In such cases, he says 
in regard to indeterminate contracts that dead-
lock is reached, i.e. a situation of opposition of 
interests in which the “pleasure-forces of the 
contractors are mutually antagonistic” (Edge-
worth, 2000, 70-71).
He argues that the impossibility of carrying 
out contracts, i.e. deadlock, would “impair [...] 
the reverence paid to competition”, in whose 
results economists have complacently acqui-
esced, as if they came directly from Nature or 
from a play of physical forces and were im-
personal and impartial. In such cases, Edge-
worth says, if respect for competition were 
lost then a need would arise for a “principle 
of arbitration” that could redirect contracts and 
put an end to conflicts. “This aspiration of the 
commercial world would be but one breath in 
the universal sigh for articles of peace” (Edge-
worth, 2000: 88).
Edgeworth then goes on to ask this: if 
competition needs to be supplemented by ar-
bitration, what should the guiding principle of 
that arbitration be? In this regard, Edgeworth 
maintains that although equity and justice are 
moral principles to be considered, they would 
not be directly applicable to the problem of the 
distribution of a joint product between co-op-
17 This is considered his best known and most notable work. It was translated into Spanish by Jordi Pascual as Psicología Matemáti-
ca (Pirámide 2000).
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erators –”the star of justice affords no certain 
guidance”. Justice, he says, requires to be in-
formed by some more definite principle; he 
points specifically to the principle of utilitar-
ianism. In short, “competition requires to be 
supplemented by arbitration, and the basis of 
arbitration between self-interested contractors 
is the greatest possible sum-total utility. Thus 
the economical leads up to the utilitarian cal-
culus” (Edgeworth, 2000: 89 - 92).
After reaching this conclusion he presents 
details of the utilitarian calculus by setting the 
following problem (Edgeworth, 2000: 93):
To find (α) the distribution of means and 
(β) of labour, the (γ) quality and (δ) number 
of population, so that there may be the greatest 
possible happiness.
Definitions:
1. Pleasure is used for “preferable feeling” 
in general […]. The term includes absence 
of pain. Greatest possible happiness is the 
greatest possible integral of the differential 
“number of enjoyers × duration of enjoy-
ment × degree thereof”.
2. Means are the distributable proximate 
means of pleasure, chiefly wealth as des-
tined for consumption and […] the unpur-
chased command of unproductive labour.
3. An individual has greater capacity for hap-
piness than another when for the same 
amount of whatsoever means he obtains 
a greater amount of pleasure, and also for 
the same increment (to the same amount) 
whatsoever of means a greater increment of 
pleasure.
4. An individual has more capacity for work 
than another when for the same amount 
whatsoever of work done he incurs a less 
amount of fatigue, and also for the same in-
crement (to the same amount) whatsoever 
of work done a lesser increment of fatigue.
In the context of the problem Edgeworth 
assumes that “pleasures may therefore be 
measured, and […] all pleasures are com-
mensurable” and that, under Bain’s Law of 
Accommodation18, “the rate of increase of 
pleasure decreases as its means increase”. Fi-
nally, regarding the initial conditions of the 
problem, he starts from the assumption that 
“each individual has and shall retain that min-
imum of means just sufficient to bring him up 
to the zero-point of happiness (a conception 
facilitated by, though not quite identical with, 
the economical ‘natural minimum of wages’)” 
(Edgeworth, 2000: 93-98).
With the problem set out in these terms, 
Edgeworth asks how successive increments in 
means (α) should be distributed among differ-
ent individuals. He discusses certain details and 
examines several specific cases, but the core of 
his explanations lies in this idea: given that the 
capacity for happiness differs from one indi-
vidual to another, the means should assigned 
as “felicifically” as possible (Edgeworth, 
2000: 99), i.e. in such a way that the highest 
overall level of happiness is attained. This, he 
states, will be achieved when the increments in 
means are distributed in direct relation to the 
capacities for happiness. He asserts that “the 
distribution of means as between the equally 
capable of pleasure is equality; and generally 
is such that the more capable of pleasure shall 
have more means and more pleasure” (Edge-
worth, 2000: 99).
The distribution of work (β) must, Edge-
worth says, take place according to an equiv-
alent criterion. Once individuals are arranged 
according to their capacity for work “the dis-
tribution of labour between the equally capa-
ble of work is equality, and generally is such 
that the most capable of work shall do more 
work –so much more work as to suffer more 
fatigue” (Edgeworth, 2000: 101).
Taking into account the distribution of 
means (α) and work (β) stated above, the great-
est possible happiness is given by the greatest 
possible value of V in the expression: 
V n F xy p c y f xp dx[ ( ) ( ) ]
x
x
0
1∫ { }= − − −
where: x is the degree of any capacity; x0 
and x1 are the given limits of integration; n is 
the number of each section; F(xy) is a unit’s 
18 The Spencer-Bain principle: observations made initially by Bain and subsequently by Spencer concerning the fact that behaviour 
which results in pleasurable consequences tends to be repeated, while that which has painful consequences tends not to be.
 http://innova.decp.uam.es/publi/descarga.php?UID=&id=2147505715&profesor=72. 
 Edgeworth maintains that an increase in means does not produce a proportional increase in pleasure, and indeed that the same 
means produce less pleasure. In that context he cites Bain’s Law of Accommodation and asserts that in accordance with it an 
increase in means permits a proportional increase in the repetition of the conditions of pleasure and therefore does not permit a 
proportional increase in pleasure (Edgeworth, 2000: 98).
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pleasure of consumption (with x being capacity 
for pleasure and y its means); p is a unit’s pain 
f work; c is the constant incidental to problems 
of relative maximum; f(xp) is the work done by 
the unit, being a function of the quality (capac-
ity for work) and fatigue (effort).
The greatest value of V may require an 
unequal distribution of means and of work 
because, contends Edgeworth, “equality is 
not the whole of distributive justice”: there 
may be a need for “deserved unequal distri-
bution”. He argues firmly in favour of the 
aristocratic privilege of man above brute, of 
civilised above savage, and of the man over 
woman19: a privilege “of birth, of talent, and 
of the male sex”. According to the cited util-
itarian principle, the basis for those privileg-
es lies in “supposed differences of capacity” 
for pleasure and pain between aristocrats and 
the lower classes. Thus “capacity for pleas-
ure is a property of evolution, an essential 
attribute of civilisation”. He also considers 
that “production is an unsymmetrical func-
tion of manual and scientific labour” and that 
Economics may afford deeper reasons that 
justify differences in the remuneration and 
the allocation of more agreeable work to the 
aristocracy of skill and talent20 (Edgeworth, 
2000: 102-111).
Edgeworth continues with the utilitarian 
calculus, focusing on quality (γ) [he refers to 
the quality of the population]. He argues that 
individuals should strive to attain the highest 
possible degree of evolution [meaning capac-
ity for pleasure]. Indeed, when he refers to 
“quality” this should be understood as a greater 
capacity for pleasure, which he sees as equiv-
alent to “high quality” of population. In this 
regard he asserts that although it may seem de-
sirable to advance the whole population by the 
same degree of evolution, this might not be the 
most desirable application given the “quantity 
of means of education”. It is probable that the 
highest in the order of evolution are the most 
capable of education and improvement. Thus, 
Edgeworth recommends that “in the general 
advance the most advanced should advance 
most” (Edgeworth, 2000: 103).
The last unknown in the utilitarian calcu-
lus problem is (δ) the size of the population. 
Edgeworth reflects on the current population 
and the desirable rate of population growth 
taking the Malthusian theory of population 
into account, albeit with reservations. He 
seeks not to provide definitive solutions but to 
“indicate an ideal” though it can only be ap-
proached with moderation, in accordance with 
human nature. Accordingly, he suggests that it 
might be desirable to agree upon some system 
of selection of descendants that is beneficial so 
that the happiness of each succeeding genera-
tion is always as great as possible. The average 
number of descendants of the classes selected, 
over and above a given degree of capacity for 
pleasure, should be high and that of the lower 
classes practically zero. Edgeworth states that 
“(a)gain, mitigations might be provided for 
the classes not selected”. At this point he cites 
Galton21 and Sully22 and writes in a footnote 
that “(t)he weak could find a welcome and a 
refuge in celibate monasteries” (Edgeworth, 
2000: 105).
In the last two pages (excluding the appen-
dices) of Mathematical Psychics Edgeworth 
insists that “(p)ending a scientific hedonim-
etry, the principle “[e]very man, and every 
19 In regard to the superiority of men over women, Edgeworth argues that men have a supposedly superior capacity for happiness, 
for the energies of action and contemplation; and upon the sentiment “woman is the lesser man, and her passions unto mine are 
as moonlight unto sunlight and as water unto wine”. He argues that her supposed generally inferior capacity is supposed to be 
compensated by a special capacity for emotions, certain kinds of beauty and refinement. Thus, under Utilitarian theory it is natural 
that they should have received a larger share of certain means, certain luxuries and attentions; and also some exemptions from 
harder work. In short, Edgeworth argues that “account being taken of existing, whether true or false, opinions about the nature of 
woman, there appears a nice consilience between the deductions from the utilitarian principle and the […] privileges which hedge 
around modern womanhood”.
20 Edgeworth argues that, in line with the utilitarian principle of the greatest overall happiness, the happiness of some of the lower 
classes may be sacrificed to that of the higher classes, and that the happiness of part of the second generation may be sacrificed 
to that of the succeeding generations. He admits, however, that there should be a required limit of happiness, which cannot be 
less than zero and must be above the starving point. Negative happiness and starvation could lead to discomfort in the lower 
classes and falls in population levels. Politics and the political economy must set some such limit above zero (Edgeworth, 
2000: 108).
21 Francis Galton (1822-1911) was a geographer, meteorologist, explorer and statistician. He is considered as the founder of dif-
ferential psychology. He was a half-cousin of Charles Darwin. He applied his principles to numerous fields, mainly the study of 
human beings and individual differences. http://galton.org/
22 James Sully (1842-1923) was an English philosopher and psychologist whose views had great affinity with those of Alexander 
Bain. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_Sully. The work by Sully to which Edgeworth refers is Pessimism, published in 1877.
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